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Philosophy and The Accident 2 
 "accident (æks_dent), sb. [a.Fr. accident: -L. accidens, -ent-, sb. properly pr. 






An accident may be defined as something which "happens".  But since all happenings "happen", 
this is scarcely helpful.  Things happen "deliberately", "intentionally", "predictably", "by 
mistake", "by chance", "unexpectedly", "through the inexorable workings of fate"; they are 
"providential", "unfortunate", "disastrous", "tragic" or "catastrophic".  They may also be 
"haphazard" or happen "at random" or they may be "Acts of God".  Where are we to fit 
"accidentally" into an adverbial taxonomy of happenings? 
 
These qualifications belong to different categories.  Some relate to agency and the ways in 
which our plans and projects compare with actual outcomes, e.g. "intentionally" and "by 
mistake".  Others are epistemological - "predictably", "unforeseeably".  We may be passing 
judgement on the value or disvalue of the event, as when, for example, we call it "providential" 
or "unfortunate".  I want to argue that the concept of the accidental combines elements from all 
of these categories making claims, simultaneously, about agency, epistemology and value. 
 
Let me describe an accident to you.  On the 6th March 1987 at around 7.00 pm the Herald of 
Free Enterprise left the Belgian port of Zeebrugge bound for Dover.  Shortly afterwards she 
capsized and sank, leaving 1/3 of the hull still above water.  It seems that the bow doors of the 
roll-on roll-off ferry had been left open enabling water to pour on to the car deck.  A ship's 
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officer, part of whose duties was to check that the bow doors had been successfully closed, was 
later found to have been asleep in his cabin at the time.  The ferry company was also criticised 
for the lack of effective procedures and guidelines to ensure that this could not happen.  Two 
hundred people were estimated to have lost their lives.1 
 
What made this an accident?  Clearly none of the ship's crew or the operating company had 
intended or expected that this should happen.  Nor had the ship been designed with the view 
that it would (though it was subsequently claimed that it, and ships like it, had not been 
carefully enough designed so that it would not).  The incident was, however, far from being 
inexplicable.  Indeed, given information about the design of the ship and state of its bow doors 
as it left the port, it could have been predicted that the ferry would sink.  It was not predicted 
because it was neither intended nor expected that the bow doors would be left open.  Even the 
sleeping ship's officer, though responsible for checking the doors, was not responsible for 
actually operating the closure mechanism and had no reason for believing that it had not been 
done.  Perhaps neither he nor any other of the crew had any idea of the possible drastic 
consequences of leaving the doors open, though a naval architect could have told them.  A 
naval architect would, however, have assumed that the doors would never have been left open.  
All the information necessary to predict the incident was available though it did not co-exist in 
any one person's head and was, therefore, effectively "hidden". 
 
Why are we concerned about such accidents?  We were concerned about Zeebrugge principally 
because of the loss of life.  But total deaths from all causes in the preceding year came to 
581,203 and in that year over 4,000 people committed suicide.2  Suicide did not make the 
  
     
1
  See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1987 and Chronicle of the Twentieth Century, Longman 1988. 
     
2
  OPCS Monitor, 87/3 
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headlines that year, however, even though Zeebrugge was, and was expected to be, a one-off 
event and the problem of suicide remains with us on a continuing basis (3,893 deaths in 19913). 
 So loss of life cannot be the only factor here. 
 
From this point of view it is interesting to compare the statistics on suicide with the homicide 
rate.  Murder always hits the headlines and the detection, conviction and punishment of 
murderers is a perennial subject of public debate.  Yet only 255 people were murdered in 19914, 
compared to the 4,000 who committed suicide.  This suggests very strongly that the degree of 
public interest and concern is not related only to the numbers involved.  For the significant 
difference between suicide and homicide in this regard is the fact that suicides, for the most 
part, intend their deaths (at the time, and however misguidedly).  Suicide is not seen as 
interfering in the control we normally think we exercise over the course and shape of our lives5 
(despite the undoubted fact that at least some apparent attempts were not intended to end in 
death).  Murder, on the other hand, is the paradigm case of such interference and it is easy to see 
how survivors of attempts and victims of other crimes of violence will often find that the most 
lingering psychological damage they suffer arises from the loss of autonomy they feel as a 
result.   
 
Accidents are also interventions in the control we (perhaps wrongly) believe we have over the 
large part of our lives.  They frustrate and, sometimes, vitiate our plans and projects for 
ourselves.  This is precisely because they are neither intended nor expected.  The clearest 
  
     
3
  OPCS Monitor, DH2 92/2 
     
4
  Op. Cit. 
     
5
  A perception reinforced by the decriminalisation of suicide by the Suicide Act of 1961. 
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evidence that this is what concerns us about them lies in the extensive apparatus we set up in 
the attempt to control accidents or to ameliorate their worst effects.  Legal recovery is possible 
in tort or negligence and there are also statutory procedures for compensation.  The criminal law 
in part aims to prevent and/or to deter criminal injuries and damage, and there are numerous 
institutions set up to foster accident prevention generally, health and safety at work, in the home 
and on the roads. 
 
Of course, not all interruptions to the control we have over our lives are, or would  naturally be 
described as, accidents.  We do not worry about strokes of good fortune.  It is not just lack of 
control that matters, but the intervention of pain, misery, distress and loss.  Our reaction to this 
is often a need to blame, to ascribe responsibility.  Sometimes this is bad faith - the attempt to 
evade our own responsibility - but it can also be a rational search for a responsible agent which 
can be prevented from allowing such a thing to happen again.  Sometimes a sense of justice or 
fairness is involved.  Misfortunes are an affront to our worth and dignity.  Those who allow 
accidents to happen fail to treat those potentially harmed with respect, showing, apparently, an 
absence of that care to which we are entitled because we are, or ought to be, as important as 
anyone else.  When human agents are involved, accidents are, prime facie, failures of respect or 
care or both, until it can be shown that there was no negligence.  
 
Accidental Death:  The Scale of the Problem 
 
In 1991 total deaths registered were 570,044, a crude rate of 11.2 per thousand population.  As 
might be expected, more than half of these were aged 75 and over, and in this group the 
commonest cause of death was heart disease.  In people younger than this (15-64 yrs) cancer 
was the most frequent cause of death, accounting for 36,907 of the 97,194 deaths in this age 
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range.  But of the 1,165 5-14 year olds who died in 1991, 587 died in accidents, and accidents 
were also the most frequent cause of death in those aged between 15 and 34 (2,870 out of 9,490, 
compared to the next most common cause of death - cancer - which accounted for 1,459).  For 
those between 35 and 44 years old, accidents were the third commonest cause of death but still 
nearly as significant in numerical terms as cancer and heart disease.  Only in those aged 45 and 
over do accidents steadily decline in importance compared to the others, becoming the eighth 
most frequent cause of death in those aged 85 and over and the seventh overall.6 
 
It is easy to be misled by such figures.  The mortality rate for human beings is 100%.  The risk 
of dying as one gets older is increased not just by external, contingent factors, but by the very 
fact of getting older.  The significance of accidents as a cause of death lies not in their relative 
number but in the fact that they are not linked to increasing age, though they are age-related, as 
we have seen.  They are the most significant cause of death in age groups whose risk of death 
from other causes is otherwise very low.  From the age of 1 until 34 you are more likely to die 
in an accident than from any other cause.7 
 
One may speculate about the reasons for this, though the evidence is suggestive.  Of the 4,408 
people who died in motor vehicle traffic accidents in 1991, the single largest group comprised 
young men aged 15-24 (959).  Accidents kill more children under 4 than any other cause and 
motor vehicle accidents account for nearly half of those accidents.8  Separate figures for 
accidents at work and sporting and leisure accidents are not available, but these must take their 
  
     
6
  Source:  OPCS Monitor, DH2 92/2, 7 July 1992 
     
7
  Op. cit. 
     
8
  Op. Cit. 
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biggest toll of those who are most involved in them, i.e. those of working age who are relatively 
fit and active.  Industrial accidents almost certainly affect younger workers more than others 
because younger workers are also more inexperienced and less responsible. 
 
 
Accidents and Social Class 
 
Accidents as a cause of mortality are also related to social class, which is rather more surprising. 
 The Black Report found that, when infant mortality was measured against parents' occupational 
class, the most marked gradients were for deaths from accidents and respiratory disease.  Infants 
(children up to twelve months of age) in social class V were five times as likely to die from 
accidental causes than those in social class I.  Similar disparities were noted in children from 1- 
14 years and in adults (though in the latter group it is far more marked in men than in women).9 
 The reason for this is, the authors conclude, that 
 
 "Households in occupational classes IV and V simply lack the means to provide 
their children with as high a level of protection as that which is to be found in 
the average middle-class home.  This can mean both material and non-material 
resources."10   
 
And also  
 
  
     
9
  The Black Report, in Inequalities in Health, ed. Peter Townsend and Nick Davidson, Penguin 1988, pp.44-48 and 
ch.6. 
     
10
  Ibid, pp.119-120. 
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 "Men engaged in manual occupations routinely confront a much higher degree 
of risk to health and physical well-being in their work than their non-manual 
counterparts.  These risks are manifold.  They may result in direct loss of life 
either suddenly in the form of accidents or in an attenuated manner through 
long-term exposure to dust or poisonous substances in the workplace."11   
 
The Report makes this striking observation: 
 
 These substantial differences demonstrate the non-random nature of these 
events.  While the death of an individual child may appear as a random 
misfortune, the overall distribution clearly indicates the social nature of the 
phenomena.12 
 
We think of accidents as random events, as things which just happen without a pattern.  It is, 
therefore, rather surprising to realise that they are not distributed among the population 
randomly, but according to factors which we recognise as social ones, i.e. as factors thrown up 
by the nature of the society which we have created.  That means that we are, as a society, 
collectively responsible (if not liable - see below, pp.9-10) for that distribution because it shows 
that it is in our power to change it.  This responsibility is clearly collective rather than 
individual, not only because no single individual can have caused it, but also it lies beyond the 
power of any single individual to change it.  The old legal principle of tort law, that where there 
is no fault, a loss should lie where it falls, seems wholly inapplicable here, if this is correct.  For 
  
     
11
  Ibid, pp.123-124. 
     
12
  Ibid p.119. 
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such losses seem not to fall at random, but on specific groups of people to whom the rest of 
society owes a duty of care to protect, so far as it is able. 
 
Another way of putting this might be to point out that, although accidents have always been 
seen as raising technical problems of prevention and avoidance, they also have an inescapably 
ethical and political dimension which has to do with our collective responsibility for the groups 
they most affect.  That, in turn, raises questions about how we, as a society, deal with the 
consequences of the pattern of accidents for which we are responsible.  I have looked, so far, 
only at accidents and mortality.  Clearly that is only the tip of an iceberg of which illness, 
disability, distress, discomfort and physical and financial loss will form by far the greater part.  
Are we to continue to let such losses lie where they fall, or, if not, how is compensation to be 
arranged?  On whom should the cost of taking such preventative measures as might be effective 
fall?  In 1991, 4,408 people died in road traffic accidents.13  They were all avoidable.  Banning 
motor cars, lorries and motorcycles would have saved all of those lives, though at a 
considerable cost.  Are those lives worth that cost?  Clearly we do not think so, or we would 
have paid it.  Or, perhaps, the idea that they are avoidable has never occurred to us. 
 
 
Causation and Accidents 
 
There is a view that everything which happens has a cause, that a cause is something which 
determines or necessitates its effect, i.e. that an effect follows necessarily from its cause.  
Therefore everything which happens, happens necessarily, i.e. could not have happened 
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otherwise.  This is determinism.  It is not the same as fatalism.  Fatalism is the view that what 
will happen will happen whatever anyone tries to do; what is fated is unavoidable.  
Determinism, on the contrary, says what is done will affect what will happen.  If action A is 
performed, it will cause C, D and E to happen.  If on the other hand B is performed, then F, G 
and H will happen, but C, D and E will not.  However, it is true, according to determinism, that 
the outcome of the choice between A and B is determined in advance of the choice by its 
preceding conditions.  A fatalist will say  "I'm fated either to pass this exam or fail it, so it does 
not matter whether I revise or not, whatever is fated will happen."  For a determinist this is quite 
wrong.  Determinism says that if I do not revise then my failure will have been caused by my 
lack of revision.  If I do revise and I pass, then my passing will have been caused by revising.  
So it matters whether I revise or not.  But it is also true according to determinism that whether I 
revise or I do not revise is caused by some prior fact, such as my laziness which in turn is 
caused by my genetic make-up or my upbringing and so on. 
 
Both the fatalist and the determinist might be thought to agree that nothing is ever an accident.  
For the fatalist this is because there is a grand design, a pattern of events which will occur 
whatever anyone does to prevent it.  This may be correct, but it is important to realise that it is 
not the same view as determinism and would not follow even if determinism were true.  
Fatalism is a matter of faith for there is no evidence that would support it.  It may even be 
wholly vacuous since it would seem to be compatible with any future possibilities whatsoever. 
 
For the determinist there is no grand design but, nonetheless, it might seem that nothing 
happens by accident.  If everything is determined then there is an internal necessity in events 
that could, in principle, make them predictable, if we knew enough about them and the laws 
which govern their behaviour.  Thus, nothing happens which could not have been foreseen.  
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Everything which happens, happens necessarily and, therefore, not accidentally.  This is a 
mistake.  An accident is not something which cannot be foreseen, but something which was not 
foreseen.  Just because something can be foreseen does not mean that it will be.  Accidents are 
not uncaused events;  an uncaused event is a miracle, not an accident.  We expect an accident to 
have causes.  Once one has occurred the first thing we do, if it matters enough to us, is to look 
around for what caused it in the hope that we will then be able to prevent its occurring again. 
 
There is also something odd in the implication that what is determined can always be foreseen.  
For what does "determined" mean here?  It does not, in most causal contexts, mean "logically 
necessary". What is determined is not foreseeable in the sense that it can be logically deduced.  
As Hume pointed out14, causal statements are not logically necessary, whatever other kind of 
necessity might be attributed to them.  Genuinely logically necessary statements are tautologous 
- they are truisms - and seldom have the cognitive content of genuine causal statements.  "It is 
either raining or it is not", or "All black birds are black" are two typical examples of logically 
necessary statements which tell us virtually nothing about the weather or ornithology.  Such 
statements are entirely foreseeable and it is easy to see why they are.  Those causal statements 
which come closest to the firmness of the logically necessary tend to be both very general and 
rather abstract:  "Raising pure water to a temperature of 100° under normal (sea-level) 
atmospheric pressure will cause it to boil."  This is based on the regularities of ordinary 
experience purified by qualification and idealisation in order to preserve it from falsity.  Thus 
we come close to making it definitionally - and hence logically - true of water that this is how it 
behaves.  The necessity is ideal rather than actual, though, for we know that many different 
factors can intervene in practice to falsify such a claim - the water will not be pure, neither the 
  
     
14
  L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Hume's Enquiries, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962 (2nd.edn.), pp.23-33. 
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temperature nor the pressure can be guaranteed, and so on.  Ordinarily, the causal claims we 
make are even more subject to qualification and exception: "Wearing silver jewellery will turn 
your skin black".  Often this is so; it depends on the purity of the silver, the sweatiness of the 
skin, the length of time the article is worn, the closeness of its contact with the skin, and so on.  
It therefore, quite often, is also not so.  Such a claim is more useful as a retrospective 
explanation - a diagnosis - than a prediction of what will happen.  "The black mark on your 
finger is caused by the silver ring you were wearing; it is not life-threatening.  It will wash off." 
 It might still be claimed that the defeasibility - or even impossibility - of prediction in such 
cases is due to ignorance and that, in principle, whether your silver ring will leave a black mark 
on your finger is foreseeable even if not actually foreseen.  But foreseeable by whom?  Many 
things we fail to foresee we know, nonethe-
less, to be foreseeable because, on other 
occasions we have foreseen just that, or a 
relevantly similar thing.  But, equally, we 
know that we, ordinary human beings, are 
not able to foresee many things; they are not 
foreseeable by us.  They are too remote in 
the future or depend on the correlation of too many variables for us to be able to predict them.  
But that does not, of course, mean that we think they are not determined; they do have causes 
and their causes are sufficient to explain their occurrence. 
Chaos Theory raises other problems15 with foreseeability and causation.  Except in very simple 
cases events occur not in causal chains but in trees which proliferate exponentially.  We should 
not look on causes like this: A causes B which causes C which causes D ... etc., but like this: A 
  
     
15
  See, for example, James Gleick, Chaos:  Making a New Science, Heinemann 1988. 
 
 A 
 / \ 
 B     C 
 / \     / \ 
 D   E     F   G 
  /\   /\        /\     /\ 
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causes B and C; B causes D and E whereas C causes F and G; D, in turn, causes H and I, E 
causes J and K, F causes L and M and G causes N and O; and so on.  Within three steps the 
single cause A has produced eight independent effects each of which will produce two more 
making sixteen in all and so on.  This is a simplified model which assumes that each cause will 
have only two effects.  This seems unrealistically small and the causal tree is likely in reality to 
be even more complex than this.  The claim is that any action will, in a very short space of time, 
have had so many consequences which themselves will have had consequences that even the 
most unimaginably large and powerful computer could not track or model them.  Reality is not 
foreseeable, not because events are not caused, but because it is so complex as to be beyond the 
computations our predictions would require. 
 
If accidents were to be defined as caused but unforeseen events, therefore, then it would seem 
that everything is an accident, if Chaos Theory is correct.  This is clearly absurd.  In the first 
place, even within Chaos Theory, predictability does exist, albeit within a relatively restricted 
time-frame; how restricted depends, presumably, on the complexity of the phenomena in 
question.  In the second place some totally unforeseeable events, such as the timing and extent 
of the hurricane force winds which occur on average every two or three hundred years in this 
country, tend to be classed as "Acts of God" rather than accidents.  The reason for this is that 
human agency is not involved.  It seems to be true that accidents, as they are normally thought 
of, involve some kind of error in human action and where we reclassify "Acts of God" as 
accidents, it is because we wish to emphasise the involvement of human error in making them 
worse than they would otherwise have been if not in actually bringing them about. 
 
 The cause of a great famine in India may be identified by the Indian peasant as 
the drought, but the World Food authority may identify the Indian government's 
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failure to build up reserves as the cause and the drought as a mere condition. .16 
  
It seems to be true, therefore, that events have causes and, if that is all determinism means, then 
determinism is probably true.  If determinism implies, in addition, that all events are, in 
principle, foreseeable, then it is probably either false or vacuous.  But that does not mean that 
we will always be wrong in our expectations about what will happen, only that those 
expectations are probabilistic not certain and that we have to deal with likelihood not necessity 
here.  Accidents are not uncaused events, nor is it true that, if every event has a cause, there can 
be no true accidents.  Accidents are caused but unexpected events (or the repercussions of 
events) involving human agency, events whose likelihood we did not see or, if we did, did not 
rate very highly. 
 
 
Responsibility and Accidents 
 
But clearly, not all unexpected events are accidents even when a human agent is involved.  
Someone who attacks and seriously injures another may not expect them to die; but if they do, 
and they do so as a result of the attack, it would hardly do to call their death an accident.  For 
though the death may not have been foreseen, it ought to have been and only a refusal to 
consider consequences could have failed to encompass it.  This is the difference between 
carelessness or negligence and recklessness, between failing in a duty of care we owe to others 
and disregarding it altogether.  The line is often difficult to draw and in many cases it is drawn 
out of policy or pragmatism rather than principle, but it distinguishes the accidental from the 
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malicious and deliberate and, in doing so, distinguishes compensation from punishment. 
 
Nonetheless, it is clearly too simple to suggest that we divide events involving human agency 
into those for which someone is responsible, and the rest which are accidents.  Certainly it is 
true that the paradigm case of something which is not an accident is the deliberate action which 
brings about what it was intended to achieve or, at the least, what was not unlooked for.  So the 
accidental is closely tied to the idea of control, as was noted earlier (see above, p.3).  What we 
control successfully is non-accidental; the accidental appears where there is imperfect control or 
no control at all.  But this does not mean that we have no responsibility for what we do not 
control, for it is also obviously true that accidents can be someone's responsibility, blame can be 
attributed for bringing them about.   
 
We need to make a distinction which ordinary language does not make entirely clear but which 
is nevertheless uncontroversial - between responsibility and liability.  We may be responsible 
for things for which we are not liable, for which we may, for example, have a good excuse or a 
defence.  (It is also possible, though this is rarer, to be liable for things for which we are not, in 
a strict sense, responsible as, for example, when we assume liability for the actions of another as 
parent, guardian or, sometimes, employer).  In this sense we are responsible for those things 
which only happened because we acted, or failed to act, as we did.  The rest - what would have 
happened anyway whatever we did - we are not responsible for (though we may, rarely, be 
liable for some of them).  The class of things for which we are, therefore, responsible is a very 
large one since it includes the non-occurrence of everything we failed to do as well as the 
results of what we did do.  Thankfully, though responsible, we are not liable for everything in 
that class;  it includes many things for which we may neither be blamed nor praised.  There is 
no single reason for or explanation of this, but an example may make it clearer.  We are 
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Philosophy and The Accident 16 
causally responsible for all the results of our failure to do things, but we are only liable where 
we had a positive duty to do them.  Many philosophy students will have unmarked essays this 
evening because of my failure to mark them.  The only students to whom I am answerable, 
however, are those whose essays I have a duty to mark.  I am not to blame for the rest.   
 
It is important to realise that doing and not doing is not the same as acting or omitting to act.  
There are things I may do just as effectively by failing to act or refraining from acting as by 
acting.  One significant example of this is the duty I have to take care in my dealings with others 
not to harm or injure them unjustifiably.  Thus, though there may be many harms which people 
suffer through my failure to prevent them, I am only liable for those I had a duty of care to try 
and prevent.   And here, a failure to act may amount to doing something - being negligent - for 
which I am to blame17.  I can, therefore, be responsible not just for the accidents which happen 
to others which I have caused, but also for those which I both failed to prevent and might, 
reasonably, have been able to prevent.  The concept of negligence is, therefore, of first 
importance in the consideration of the accidental.  For the deliberately brought about is, by 
definition, non-accidental.  That for which no one is responsible or liable might be accidental, 
but is more likely to be an act of God, i.e. an event with no human contribution at all.  
Nonetheless, the locus of interest in most cases ties the accident to related notions of blame, 




Contracts and Accidents 
  
     
17
  Karl Figlio, in P.Weindling (ed), The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, 1985, p.183. 
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Figlio18 defines an accident as "as unforeseen event which is also expected" (p.180).  It must be 
said, however, that Figlio's paper, though challenging and interesting, is not a model of clarity.  
For he also says that accidents can only be formulated as "distinct events" once social relations 
become contractually based and a "...field of natural expectation is ... invaded by retrospectively 
predictable but unforeseen events..." (p.181).  So are accidents "expected" or do they invade 
(i.e., presumably, violate ?) "a field of natural expectation", (i.e. are they unexpected)?  Later he 
adds (p.184) that in traditional cultures "Nothing could happen by accident, when every event is 
scrutinised for its place in the dense fabric of expectation."  (I.e. everything is expected, so 
nothing can be accidental?)  The truth is that accidents are both expected and unexpected.  
There is the statistical regularity of kinds of accidents within given populations and time-frames 
together with the unforeseeable (or, at least, unforeseen) nature of particular accident instances. 
  
 
What Figlio seems to be concerned with is this.  The world is not static but in flux.  Its history is 
constituted of sequences of events which change the state of things through time.  Countless 
many such events occur but not all of them are or are accounted accidents.  A leaf falls from a 
tree and lands on the ground.  A cat leaps to catch a bird.  Someone at bus stop flags down a bus 
and catches it.  All of these events change the world in a very minor way and none of them are 
accidents.  They simply happen.  Accidents occur, according to Figlio, when we have 
expectations, formed or inchoate and unexplicit, which are then violated by the unforeseen but, 
probably, foreseeable.   
 
  
     
18
  Op. Cit. 
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It follows from this that the idea of an accident only gets off the ground in formal, legal terms 
once the legal notion of a contract becomes the normal way of regulating relations between 
individuals.  Because only with a contract can we have a set of expectations about how things 
ought to be, in the normal way, which forms the background for the specific agreement - the set 
of duties and rights - which forms the contract itself.  Why is this so?  To answer that question, 
we must step back a little way and ask what a contract is.   
 
Legally the concept of a contract is very complicated, but basically it is a formal promise which 
is intended to have legal consequences.  A promise is, usually, made by virtue of a speech-act19 - 
a form of words which does not describe or, necessarily, accompany an action, but is, itself, an 
action of a kind.  To say "I declare you man and wife" is not to describe an act of marrying 
someone, but to perform it.  Likewise, to say to A "I promise to X", is all that one need do for it 
to be the case that one has made a promise to A.  However, there may be many occasions when 
saying "I declare you man and wife" is not sufficient for a legal marriage to have taken place.  
There are also a number of background conditions which need to hold.  The words need to be 
uttered by the right person - a minister of the Church of England, for example, or a Registrar - 
in the right place, the persons concerned must be free to marry, a licence must have been 
obtained, etc.  In the same way, saying "I promise to X" only amounts to making a promise 
where the right context exists - both parties must understand what the words mean, the 
promisor must not be coerced or in any other way not fully consenting, and so on.  In the case of 
what we might call a "moral" promise, these conditions are a little vague and the limiting cases 
undefined.  A "legal" promise, or contract, on the other hand is much more tightly specified - 
the promisee must offer the promisor a consideration in return for the promise, for example, 
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  The classic text on speech-acts is J.L. Austin., How to Do Things With Words, Oxford University Press 1962. 
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and both promisor and promisee must intend to create not just mutual rights and 
responsibilities, as in any promise, but legally enforceable ones. 
 
A characteristic of all speech-acts is that, although it may be possible to give a complete 
specification of the positive conditions necessary for the act in question to have been performed, 
there are also negative conditions it is not possible to specify completely.  This is because the 
negative conditions can be summed up by saying that the background conditions must be 
normal (for the act in question).  What this means, in effect, is that things must be, more or less, 
as those involved take them to be.  If I promise to lend you £50 next week, not knowing that 
next week I shall be bankrupted by the unexpected collapse of the stock market, or you promise 
to collect my dry cleaning next Tuesday not knowing, because I also did not know, that 
someone else has already collected it for me, then those promises do not hold.  Whether we 
would say that they are "negated", "compromised" or simply laid aside (whether, that is, we 
would say they were never actually made, though they seemed to be, or whether, though made, 
they no longer hold good) ordinarily is left unclear because it does not matter, the effect is the 
same.  In legal cases this may not be so, and it may be vital to decide whether a contract is 
"void", "illegal", "voidable" or simply "unenforceable"20.  Much of the "Law of Contract" is 
devoted to the examination of masses of case-law in order to determine what the "normal" 
background to the making of a contract is and what the legal consequences might be of it being 
violated in particular kinds of ways. 
 
Thus the notion of a "contract" implies acceptance of a correlative notion of what constitutes the 
"normal", the background against which it is possible to make any contract and the background 
  
     
20
  A.G. Guest (ed), Anson's Law of Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969 (23rd ed.), p.7. 
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against which this particular contract is made.  It is against this background that the notion of an 
"accident" can be delineated by contrast, for an "accident" is precisely what a violation of that 
background is. 
 
As Figlio notes without commenting on it, the move towards contract as a framework for 
regulating human relations dates from the Enlightenment with the development of 
individualism as an ideology of human nature.  Before that point, what we might now call 
"accidents" were seen as "symbolically important indicators of social integrity and disruption".  
As such, they are expected: 
  "Something like that was just about to happen and not necessarily to anyone in 
particular, though `just deserts' might frequently be commented upon.  An 
injury, an illness, or some other misfortune, brings relief from the rising 
community temperature.  Nothing could happen by accident, when every event 
is scrutinized for its place in the dense fabric of expectation."21 
 
The shift from this communitarian perspective to the individualistic one which the dominance 
of contract presupposes was an improvement only for those strong individuals whose situation 
allowed them to take full advantage of it.  The ideology of contract assumes, in other words, an 
equality of power between contractors which is notably absent in most employment contracts 
now as then.  Thus the law of tort, developing alongside contract, assumed that, unless fault 
could be demonstrated, "the loss lies where it falls".  In a society of equals, where else should it 
fall?  Accidents, no longer incorporated into the fabric of communal life, are hazards which 
befall individuals who must remain uncompensated unless an author of their misfortune can be 
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found.  It would not, therefore, be possible for an employee to sue an employer for an injury 
incurred in the course of employment unless malice or gross negligence could be proved.  
Since, in addition, it was standardly assumed that workers undertaking risky employments 
voluntarily undertook to run those risks, it is not surprising that, in Figlio's words "the 
relationship with respect to compensation for injury between employer and employee was 
skewed in the employer's favour".22 
 
Figlio would seem, then, to be asserting the claim that it is with the development of the 
contractual relationship that the possibility of an accident was created23.  It would have been 
clearer had he maintained that what it makes possible is the legal idea of an accident, of 
something that is, though an accident, still legally actionable.  This was not straightforward 
simply because of the need to provide a legal remedy whilst at the same time preserving the 
idea that an accident was no one's fault.  What this did, in Figlio's own words, was to legitimate 
the notion of "accountability without culpability"24, i.e. liability without responsibility.  This was 
a radical departure from the governing principle of tort law - that without fault, the loss must lie 
where it falls, and it represents a significant moment in the historical evolution of the ideology 
of law, which Figlio does not comment on. 
 
What, in effect, happened in the historical period that Figlio refers to, was a move towards 
creating employer responsibility for terms and conditions of work by writing the assumption of 
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  Figlio, op. cit., p.182. 
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  "My argument is that the growing prominence of contract relationships and contract law, mainly from the sixteenth 
century for the general case, and the nineteenth century for master/servant relationships, established the possibility of an 
accident."  Figlio, op. cit., p.183. 
     
24
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a safe working environment into the implied terms and conditions of the employment contract.  
This represents a shift in what is seen as the proper scope of law, a shift from arbitrating 
disputes between free and equal individuals to engineering and improving social conditions as 
an agent of society.25  We have, in other words, moved on from the ideology of individualism 
which created contract law to a social conception of law which, far from creating the idea of an 
accident, as Figlio claims, actually abrogates it.  For if an accident is something which happens 
in the space between cause and motive, something for which a human agent is responsible but 
not, necessarily, liable, then the panoply of legislative instruments and legal devices which 
constitutes current public and employment law fills that space.  Everything which happens is 
someone's liability, even if no one's fault.  This notion is, at present, imperfectly realised.  But 
the law is working towards its realisation and the pressures exist for it to continue.  Atiyah has 
argued that the case for `no-fault' compensation is unanswerable on moral and logical grounds 
and that even on policy and economic grounds it is exceedingly plausible.26  Brazier makes a 
similar case for the field of medical compensation.27  The reaction to the Zeebrugge accident 
was to campaign for a corporate manslaughter charge against the owners for the first time in 
English law, because it was clear that no individual was liable for the harm caused. 
 
It would seem that the circle is closing and the social conception of the accident as no accident 
at all is returning28.  It is not precisely the same, of course.  No return ever is.  We do not now 
see injury and illness as symbolic of the health of the community, but as signs of the justice of 
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  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound's Social Control through Law, Yale University Press New Haven, 1942. 
     
26
  Atiyah, P.S. & Cane, P., Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1987 (4th ed.) 
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  Margaret Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law, Penguin Harmondsworth, 1992 (2nd ed.). 
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the state.  If no one else is liable, then the state is.  And if nothing can happen for which no one 
is liable, then there are no true accidents any more. 
As Rawls put it: 
 
 The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust. ... What is just and unjust is the way 
that institutions deal with these facts. ... The social system is not an unchangeable order 





Accidents, then, are interventions - slippages - in the control we attempt to exert over the course 
of lives.  As such, they feel random, unpredictable and threatening and we, inevitably, try and 
minimise their impact as far as we are able.  That they are not as random as they appear is 
shown by the fact that they exhibit a pattern which matches certain social profiles, namely age 
and class.  Accidents are more prevalent amongst the young and the poor than amongst the old 
and the rich.  They are, therefore, socially rather than randomly distributed and are, thus, an 
inescapably social phenomenon.  Though accidents feel unpredictable, there is no reason in 
theory to think that this is so.  Indeed, statistically speaking, we know it to be false.  Accidents 
are not unforeseeable, but only unforeseen, and then, only unforeseen in the particular, not the 
general case.  In 1990 4,898 people died in motor vehicle accidents.  In 1991 the figure was 
4,408.30  It seems entirely predictable that the equivalent figures for 1992 and 1993 (when they 
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  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.102.  See also Mary Midgley, "The Flight from 
Blame", in Philosophy, vol. 62, 1987, pp271-292. 
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  OPCS Monitor, DH2 92/2. 
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become available) will show only minor variations from these.  What we do not and cannot 
know is to whom, exactly, these accidents will happen.  
 
The ability to foresee accidents, though it may make us responsible (in the sense that we are in a 
position to do something, however little, about them), does not necessarily make us liable, 
however.  Liability is incurred only when there is also a duty of care, when there is, in other 
words, the possibility of negligence.  What has been noted above is a shift in the conception of 
who has that duty.  Whereas, from the Enlightenment to comparatively recent times, that duty 
has been conceived of only in terms of the individual, from the nineteenth century there has 
been a growing tendency, reflected in the quotation from John Rawls, to think of that duty as 
belonging to society through the medium of the state.  Increasingly, the state is being held liable 
both for policies designed to reduce the incidence of accidental death and injury and also for 
compensating those who suffer it.  The state is, in other words, being held liable for attempting 
to reduce the impact that the accidental has on people's lives.  It is worth noting that the 
ideology of the conservative administrations in both the U.K. and U.S. since the early 80's is in 
direct opposition to this tendency, inclining, as both do, to reassert the responsibility of the 
individual for his or her own welfare.  It will be interesting to see which will prove dominant in 
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